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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The state's argument is misplaced, and is an attempt to "cloud 
the waters". The sole basis for the dismissal of the petition of 
Mr. Tucker was the insistance by th office of the Attorney General 
that claims were improperly filed under URCiv.P 65B, and must be 
filed under 65C. Yet the Attorney General's office, in its resp-
onse, now claims that the petition was properly filed under 65B. 
This, alone, should be reason enough to find for the appellant and 
grant him his relief. 
The state's argument that Mr. Tucker fails to state a claim 
is equally flawed, and fatally so. Primarily, a pro se litigant's 
pleadings are to be construed liberally, and if they can reasonab-
ly be read to state a claim they must be read as such. Secondly, 
Mr. Tucker raises at minimum four valid claims for relief: 
a. The search of his computer and property, not by parole off-
icers, but by police officers, 
b. The arrest waarant issued in violation of the Fourth Amen-
dment , 
c. The cancellation of his revocation hearing for "adjudica-
tion of new charges" at least two weeks before any such 
charges existed, and 
d. The "ex post facto" application of Utah Code Ann. 76-3-202 
(8)(1999) to his May 18, 1990 sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DISMISSAL OF PETITION AS MIS-FILED 
The Attorney General concedes that the petition was properly 
filed under URCiv.P 65B. As the entire of their argument for dis-
missal consisted of their claim that Mr. Tucker's petition was im-
properly filed under 65B, and considering the extensive resources 
in manpower, experience, and materials at the disposal of the off-
ice of the Attorney General, this court should consider all argu-
ments from the state, beyond the "65B or 65C?" question as for-
feited. 
The state, in the person of the office of the Attorney Gener-
al, is not on appeal here. Mr. Tucker is. The state had plenty of 
opportunity to present its case. It chose as its case the frivol-
ous argument that Mr. Tucker's petition was improperly filed, ab-
andoning all other arguments. The state would now have this Court 
grasp at any possible means to clean up its "fouled nest11, and at 
the same time makes the claim that no harm, no error, has occurr-
ed. This is not the case. The fact of the matter is that the state 
would perpetuate the harms, the same harms, that Mr. Tucker was 
seeking relief from in the first place. This Court should not al-
low that, and should grant Mr. Tucker the relief he seeks in the 
form of a published opinion, sending a clear message to all the 
agents of the state that abuses against its citizens, all of its 
citizens, will be neither condoned nor even tolerated. 
II. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
a. The search of the computer and property. 
The state is correct that parole officers can conduct warrant-
less searches, based upon reasonable suspicion, and in their ca-
pacity as parole officers and not as peace officers. 
They cannot, however, assist police in evading the warrant re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
The testimony, in federal court, of Det.'s Atack and Gruber, 
two of the detectives conducting the search, makes it plain that 
the search was a police investigation and not a parole search. De-
tective Gruber was in sole control of the computer, while Det. A-
tack and other police officers, and not parole officers, searched 
the apartment. AP&P opened the door to Mr. Tucker's apartment and 
gave the police free reign. AP&Pfs sole contribution, beyond gain-
ing entrance for the police, was to secure Mr. Tucker and keep 
watch over him during the search. Both Atack and Gruber testified 
that it was Gruber who interrogated Mr. Tucker about various find-
ings on his computer during the search, and that it was Atack who 
ordered Gruber to search the computer in the first place. 
Jennifer Bartell, of AP&P, gave long and eloquent testimony 
(perjuring herself in the process, of which Mr. Tucker notified 
the Attorney General's office and provided copies of Atack1s and 
Gruberfs reports. The Attorney General chose to do nothing with 
this information.) as to how everything was conducted at her di-
rection, testimony and reports of the detectives notwithstanding. 
Also relevant to this issue is the fact that Bartell testified 
that Utah parole officers are peace officers (thus they were act-
ing as police not as parole officers), and the fact that absolute-
ly none of the evidence (which Bartell testified was gathered at 
her direction) was requested by AP&P from the police for use to 
violate Mr. Tucker's parole. 
b. The arrest warrant. 
The state claims that a parole officer may arrest a parolee 
without a warrant. This is only partly true. This arrest, called 
an "administrative detention", is only valid for 72 hours. Beyond 
that AP&P must request a warrant from the Board of Pardons (Board) 
Mr. Tucker was taken into custody at his home the night of June 
11, 1998. The next afternoon AP&P had received a "Board warrant" 
for Mr. Tucker's actual arrest and return "to actual custody". As 
Mr. Tucker has pointed out, and the fact which the Attorney Gen-
eral continues to ignore, this warrant was issued in violation of 
both the Utah and the United States constitutions. Specifically, 
the warrant states that Mr. Tucker is to be arrested so that it 
can be determined whether there i^ probable cause to believe that 
he has violated his parole. This is the issuance of a warrant for 
arrest in the absence of probable cause. 
c\ Cancellation of revocation hearing. 
The Attorney General states that the Board may "for good 
cause" continue a hearing beyond 30 days. Would the Attorney Gen-
eral have the Court believe that charges that did not yet exist at 
the time of the cancellation of the revocation hearing is an ex-
ample of "good cause"? Mr. Tucker would respectfully remind this 
Court that at the time the revocation hearing was finally held, a 
full 19 months after Mr. Tucker's arrest, his federal trial, and 
thus the "adjudication" of the charges, was still a full year in 
the future. Thus, the Attorney General would have this Court be-
lieve that to cancel the hearing to adjudicate charges that do not 
yet exist, and then 19 months later to hold the hearing before the 
trial of Mr. Tucker's charges constitutes "good cause11. This stag-
gers ones sense of credulity. Where is the basis for the Attorney 
general's contention that Mr. Tucker does not state a claim? 
d. Ex post facto application of UC 76-3-203(8). 
Subsection (8) was amended to UC 76-3-203 in 1999, a full nine 
years after Mr. Tucker was sentenced in May of 1990. The applica-
tion of this law to Mr. Tucker's 1990 sentence increases the ex-
piration of his sentence from April 16, 2005 until August of 2009 , 
effectively increasing the length of his sentence by four years. 
Mr. Tucker would point out that this is not a case where a 
prisoner is released on parole, commits a crime, and finds himself 
incarcerated outside of the state before"he can be transported 
back to Utah to have his parole revoked, as is the obvious intent 
of the statute. The parole that Mr. Tucker was serving at the time 
when the federal charges came about has already been revoked on 
02-02-2000. 
There are two paroles at question here; one, beginning in May 
of '96, during which the incidents described herein occurred and 
resulted in federal prosecution, and another, granted after fed-
eral prosecution and releasing Mr. Tucker to federal custody. Mr. 
Tucker is not in any way in violation of this new parole, and in 
fact accepted the parole in good faith as what it was purported 
to be: a grant of parole. The Board themselves, in this case, are 
the agents of Mr. Tucker's transfer to federal custody by granting 
him "parole". To all intents and purposes Mr. Tucker might as well 
have a detainer filed against him, but without the protections 
and rights that a formal detainer would grant him. For the reasons 
stated above Mr. Tucker's time spent "on parole11 to federal cus-
tody should be counted toward his Utah sentence unless this Court 
grants Mr. Tucker the relief of terminating that sentence. 
III. FAILURE TO AMEND PETITION 
Mr. Tucker offered at trial to remove the claims for damages 
from his petition. As the Attorney General has generously pointed 
out, the court below had no jurisdiction to hear the damage claims. 
Consequently, that court had no jurisdiction to dismiss those 
claims with prejudice. As Mr. Tucker withdrew the claims, and as 
the Attorney General concedes that the remaining claims were prop-
erly filed under 65B, what was there to amend? 
CONCLUSION 
The state admits that Mr. Tucker's claims were properly filed 
under 65B, even though their sole argument at trial was that they 
were not. Now the state begs this Court to find any other reason 
to affirm the original invalid dismissal of Mr. Tucker's petition, 
thereby stamping Its seal of approval on the violation of Mr. Tuck-
er's rights. But the state had its day in court, and they were 
found wanting. For this reason alone Mr. Tucker asks that this 
Court grant his requested relief. 
But the state then falls back on the lame argument that Mr. Tucker 
fails to state a claim. This argument should have been raise in 
the court below instead of the frivolous and recanted claim that 
the petition was improperly filed under Rule 65B. But be that as 
it may, the state's argument that Mr. Tucker fails to state a 
claim fails miserably. For all of the foregoing reasons Mr. Tucker 
prays this Court grant him his requested relief. 
MR.TUCKER DOES NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT, 
BUT DOES REQUEST A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Mr. Tucker requests a published opinion to deter further and 
future abuses of the nature outlined herein. A clear message must 
be sent by this Court that consistent violations of any citizen's 
rights by agents of the state make a mockery of the judicial sys-
tem, fostering public contempt for the judicial process. The sanc-
tity and integrity of the courts must be preserved in the public 
eye. 
Respectfully submitted this [ \ day of August, 2002 
ZKER 
Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and 
exact copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to the below named per-
sons on this of August,2002: 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S. 6th floor 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
ADDENDUM 
The arguments present in this reply are well supported by 
authentic transcripts of the three evidentiary hearings which 
took place during Mr. Tucker's federal trial. Mr. Tucker has pro-
vided some documentation with his original petition. However, on 
his release to federal custody Mr. Tucker was not allowed to tran-
fer his collected legal materials. Does does believe that, should 
this Court wish to review these transcripts, Ms. Deirdre Gorman, 
who was Mr. Tucker's attorney during his federal trial, would be 
happy to supply the transcripts from the three evidentiary hear-
ings. Mr. Tucker apologizes for the paucity of documentation and 
authority which he presents, and hopes that what he was able to 
present with his petition, while it was still available to him, 
is sufficient. 
Ms. Gorman's address is: 
DEIRDRE A. GORMAN 
205 26th Street Ste. #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 394-5526 
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